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Financial innovation, which was originally introduced for a positive aim, over time has 
actually had relevant negative effects on the economy. This occurred because it encouraged 
intermediaries to change their way of operating, allowing them to modify their solvency 
without changing radically their external shape. Financial innovation, which developed on 
account of both the need to finance the growing USA external debt and the tendency of 
American families to incur into excessive debts, is certainly the main cause lying behind 
the recent financial crises. In the future, these can be avoided only by means of a strict 
regulation of financial markets.  
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Traditional economics textbooks describe banks as institutions performing almost uniquely 
traditional financial intermediation, i.e. receiving deposits and issuing loans. This type of 
bank is rapidly disappearing. It is being substituted by a new type of bank that offers clients 
an increasingly diversified range of services. An effect of this change is that the revenues 
accruing from interests are becoming less and less important in banks’ balance sheets while 
those tied to commissions, or to the purchase (or sale) of securities on financial markets, are 
growing. This phenomenon occurred both in the United States and in Europe especially 
during the ‘Nineties. In the US the share of revenues not originating from interests passed 
from some 20% in the ‘Eighties in last century to 43% in 2001 (Stiroh, 2004). In Europe it 
went from 26% in 1989 to 41% in 1998 (European Central Bank, 
 2000). 
This dramatic change was certainly fostered by new technologies, and especially by the 
spreading  of  new  channels  for  electronic  data  transmission.  However  the factor that  is 
almost  unanimously  acknowledged  as  being  the  main  element  to  speed  up  the 
transformation of the banking system is the liberalization of financial markets (Ciarrapico 
and Cosci, 2008). In the course of the last twenty years regulations changed both in the US 
and  in  Europe,  allowing  new  subjects,  other  than  banks,  to  operate  on  markets  where 
previously only banks operated and also allowing banks to extend their activities to other 
markets, besides the usual supply of loans to enterprises. As the offer of activities on behalf Economic Interferences  ￿￿ 
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of banks became more diversified, interest margins became thinner, both in the United 
States and in Europe. Some scholars interpreted this fact as a natural reaction of banks to 
growing competition on the credit market. 
If on the one hand it is no more possible to teach that banks’ main  activity – possibly the 
only one – is that of receiving deposits and issuing loans, on the other hand also traditional 
analyses of the money market are becoming meaningless. Money markets are no longer 
represented  by  essentially  two  types  of  securities,  (fixed  income)  bonds  and  (variable 
income)  shares.  Financial  innovation  has  created,  and  continues  to  create,  a  growing 
number of different securities, the so-called derivatives, and now a great number of them 
exist. 
 
1. The United States’ foreign deficit and its effects 
The causes of the huge, abnormal, development of financial innovation are essentially two. 
The first one is represented by the enormous growth in international liquidity. The latter, in 
turn,  stems  mainly  from  the  current  account  deficit  of  the  United  States’  balance  of 
payments. This country started recording a deficit in 1972 and never ceased doing so since 
then; now the deficit is more than 6% of the country’s GDP. Moreover, the United States’ 
deficits are growing, notwithstanding the strong devaluation of the dollar. Since the early 
‘Seventies the situation of the US economy has changed completely with respect to that of 
the  ‘Sixties  or  even  earlier,  when  the  American  trade  balance  had  a  surplus  and  the 
outflows of capital balanced the balance of payments or else made it negative. 
The financial crisis that exploded in 2008 eventually lead commentators throughout the 
world to investigate a number of features of the American economy that should have been 
questioned long since both by economists and politicians. This refers to the need to analyse 
the  structural  causes  of  the  low  competitiveness  of  the  American  economy  as  a whole 
together with the prospective effects of the growth of the American foreign debt. 
Until the early ‘Sixties in the last century foreign trade was scarcely important for the 
American economy. In 1960 the US exports of goods and services represented less than 5% 
of GDP. Imports were still lower, given that the American trade balance was at the moment 
positive. Nowadays exports represent some 10% of GDP while imports are over 15% (the 
trade deficit is around 6% of GDP). However, the most important aspect is that American 
goods currently face international competition, which did not occur until the ‘Sixties in the 
last century. 
The  American  trade  deficit  is  financed  by  the  inflow  of  capitals  from  abroad.  The 
liberalization of capital flows that occurred in the last twenty years is at the root of this. 
Capitals flow into the United States under the form of both purchases of Treasury Bonds 
and Bills and of shares of American corporations on behalf of foreigners. Naturally, to 
encourage the latter to purchase US securities, Treasury Bonds must offer a relatively high 
interest rate, and also the dividend paid by American corporations must be high. 
Actually, for years American financial markets ensured the distribution of high dividends. 
Together with the growth of the new economy, throughout the ‘Nineties this determined a 
massive inflow of capital. However the phenomenon slowed down in the early 2000 when 
the foreign deficit of the US started to be financed mainly through the net purchase of 
bonds on behalf of foreigners. More in detail, the purchase of US Treasury Bonds has ￿￿  Some Thoughts on Financial Innovation  and Financial Crises 
 
Amfiteatru Economic  524 
grown strongly in the last years, essentially due to intervention of the monetary authorities 
of other countries. It is worth noting that since the end of 2001 until to-day the purchase of 
Treasury Bonds by American residents is virtually nil. Over the years, the US has reached a 
foreign debt equal to some 27% of gross domestic product. 
These facts should have made us consider the possibility that, notwithstanding the size and 
the growth potential of the American economy and notwithstanding the country’s political 
and military role, its growing foreign debt would sooner or later determine a confidence 
crisis with strong negative effects on the world economy and on international economic and 
monetary relations. Actually, the American growth rates from the ‘Nineties on were based 
on  extremely  peculiar  features,  such  as  the  strong  expansion  of  consumption  and 
investment and the growth of the trade deficit. 
The growth in expenditure for consumption was only in part linked to a growth in families’ 
incomes, while it was largely financed by debt. The use of credit cards, of instalment credit, 
of real estate mortgages together with other instruments allowed the huge growth in the 
indebtedness  of  American  families,  while  the  propensity  to  save  fell  progressively, 
approaching zero. 
Investments, especially in the new economy, were financed by foreign savings, i.e. by the 
huge inflow of capital from abroad. Flows took the form of the direct purchase of American 
enterprises, besides, as seen, purchases of shares and bonds. The value of American assets 
owned by foreigners now reaches some two thirds of the United States’ GDP. 
However,  to  better  understand  the  mechanisms  underlying  growth  in  the  presence  of 
strongly expanding consumption financed by an abnormal rise in families’ debt, investment 
financed  by  high  inflows  of  capital  from  abroad  and  a  huge  trade  deficit,  one  should 
analyse the role and the transformation of financial markets in some depth. Starting from 
the  ‘Seventies  and especially  during  the  ‘Eighties and  ‘Nineties  in  the  last century the 
functioning of American enterprises and financial markets underwent structural changes. 
The goal of the firm’s growth based on self-financing and investment in research, that was 
central in managers’ strategies, gradually started losing importance in American culture. On 
the other hand the revenue accruing from shares became firms’ main target – eventually the 
only  one.  The  firms’  goal  has  increasingly  become  that  of  maximising  shareholders’ 
revenue  in  the  short  run.  Dividends  and  the  market  value  of  shares  therefore  became 
managers’ only concern. Their own wages were often linked to the value of shares through 
various mechanisms, like that of stock options. 
The causes of this phenomenon that is now producing its destructive effects through an 
international financial crisis are debatable. One element is linked to the fall in profits and 
growth due to the oil crisis in the ‘Seventies. Lower profits could have made shareholders 
claim higher dividends and in general a bigger consideration of their specific interest rather 
than of those of the firm in se. 
Another element is the return of the typically American idea that property rights rank first. 
This entails restoring shareholders’ legitimate rights, which had been somewhat by-passed 
since a class of professional managers had de facto undertaken the management of firms, 
creating  the  well-known  separation  between  property  and  control.  Actually  during  the 
‘Eighties  in  the  last  century  a  number  of  associations  and  movements  defending 
shareholders’ rights was created. Economic Interferences  ￿￿ 
 
Vol XI • Nr. 26 • June 2009  525 
However,  the  main  cause  behind  the  spreading  of  the  idea  that  firms’  most  important 
objective – if not the only one – should be shares’ returns rather than the firm’s growth lies 
in the change in firm ownership. The process started in the ‘Seventies and speeded up 
during the ‘Eighties. Towards the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century 
shares passed from a small number of the firms’ founder families to a great number of 
shareholders.  The  fragmentation  of  ownership  led  to  the  growing  power  of  managers. 
However, around the early ‘Seventies share ownership started to be again concentrated, this 
time in big financial institutions, like investment and pension funds. More in detail, albeit 
being always divided among a huge number of savers, financial wealth was now managed 
by  institutional  investors  which,  being  relatively  few,  could  convey  their  orders  and 
conditions to managers. Institutional investors encouraged managers – and still do – to 
privilege only the market value and the returns of shares irrespective of other goals. 
The effects of this transformation became evident during the ‘Nineties, when the booming 
new economy directed huge capital flows towards the shares of firms operating in this 
sector, making their market value rise enormously. Together, also directors’ salaries rose 
enormously in most of the largest American corporations (largely through stock options), 
while investment in research and development fell. During the ‘Sixties in the last century 
44%  of profits, net  of taxes, was paid as dividends while during the ‘Nineties 85% of 
profits was distributed. Institutional investors change their portfolio continuously, much 
more  frequently  than  before,  in  order  to  grant  their  clients  higher  returns,  even  re-
purchasing their own shares to keep the price high (Hutton, 2002). 
The evolution of the American economy over the last twenty years calls for some thoughts. 
Firms’ management aimed at maximising the market value of shares together with their 
short run returns entails cutting costs, i.e. not only reducing investments in the long run, 
especially those pertaining to research and to improving human capital, but also curtailing 
employment and wages. The degree of inequality in income distribution rose significantly 
over  the  last  twenty  years,  while  the  benefits  of  the  welfare  state  –  especially  for 
unemployment benefits - fell. 
The excessive expansion of the financial sector in the economy made the majority groups 
and the managers of large companies concentrate more and more on financial speculation, 
and always less on the production of goods. 
Since the ‘Eighties takeovers have intensified, often in the form of financial groups buying 
on the Stock Exchange many shares – often the majority - of firms operating in any sector. 
This leads to the formation of concentrated conglomerates. 
Generally speaking, mergers may improve efficiency by means of higher concentration, 
with the entailed advantages of more integration and coordination among firms. However 
this occurs only whenever a group buys a firm to keep it indefinitely, or for a long period. If 
instead a group buys a firm with the intention of re-selling it shortly after, it performs a 
purely  speculative  action.  It  will never  attempt  to  integrate  or to  coordinate  the firm’s 
activity because, quite the opposite, this would reduce saleability, inasmuch as it would 
limit the firm’s independence. 
If mergers have a purely speculative intent, i.e. their main aim is that of raising a firm’s 
worth on the Stock Exchange in order to sell it soon after, it is quite unlikely they will make 
overall efficiency improve. ￿￿  Some Thoughts on Financial Innovation  and Financial Crises 
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Actually, the so-called “market of control” that developed rapidly in the United States from 
the ‘Eighties on was based almost entirely on short-run speculative operations. 
Therefore the abnormal development of financial innovation may be initially explained by 
the peculiar evolution of the American economy, by the need to finance the current account 
deficit of its balance of payments and by the ensuing spreading of a “speculative” attitude, 
both among firms and, to a lesser extent, among families. 
 
2. Financial innovation and risk management 
The second cause lying behind the spreading of increasingly complex financial instruments 
is the attempt to finance extremely risky activities by spreading the risk on other subjects, 
eventually dividing it among a very big number of units by means of derivatives. The value 
of these securities is linked to the return of other financial instruments or indexes. They 
were  initially  created  to  cover  and  to  hold  market  risks  in  check  but  in  practice  most 
financial  intermediaries  used  them  to  speculate  on  the  volatility  of  rates  or  of  other 
reference  parameters.  In  particular  this  was  the  case  for  second  generation,  so-called 
“synthetic”  derivatives.  These  operations  by-passed  the  principle  according  to  which 
intermediaries should direct savings towards the most profitable investment projects. In a 
framework  à la  Schumpeter  this principle assigns  the  bank  a  central  role  in  economic 
development. 
The  size  of  the  market  for  derivatives  has  grown  incredibly  over  a  few  years.  It  was 
estimated to equal 600 billion dollars in 1999 and to have reached 17 trillion dollars only 
seven  years  later,  in  2006  (Ashcraft  and  Santos,  2007).  Most  scholars  believe  that 
globalization is the main cause of the development of this market because it exposes firms, 
investors  and  governments  to  new  risks,  both  exchange  rate  risks  and  political  ones. 
Moreover, agents issuing derivatives were compelled to face the peculiarities of potential 
clients belonging to diverse populations. The uncertainties of the global financial market 
lead to the creation  of securities apt to  manage and to “exploit” the new risks (Smith, 
Smithson e Wilford, 1990). 
In  economic  literature  authors  agree  that  innovation  may  have  both  a  positive  and  a 
negative impact on society, but not all agree on its net effect. Not all of them claim that 
financial innovation is a “positive-sum game”
1. 
For  some  scholars  financial  innovation  is  actually  the  engine  that  allows  the  financial 
system to achieve its ultimate goal, helping the real economy operate (Merton, 
 1995). From 
the point of view of economic theory, it is possible to claim that, given incomplete markets, 
financial innovation is an instrument that gives operators a wider range to choose from, 
which raises social welfare à la Pareto. However, other models show that the introduction 
of a new financial asset may also reduce social welfare
2. 
Innovation  allows  a  financial  intermediary  to  differentiate  its  supply  with  respect  to 
competitors.  This  raises  its  ability  in  satisfying  clients’  needs.  In  principle,  innovation 
represents the invention of more effective financial solutions to satisfy clients’ new needs. 
It thus contributes to making financial markets more efficient. At the same time, however, 
the innovation created by an intermediary may have a negative impact on social welfare. 
                                                
1 See the survey by Tufano (2003). 
2 See for instance R. Elul (1995). Economic Interferences  ￿￿ 
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This occurs whenever it raises information asymmetries to the damage of potential buyers 
and to the advantage of the creators of the innovation. Innovation makes a potential buyer 
undertake a costly effort to gain knowledge. This may be ineffective inasmuch as the buyer 
may not always achieve the necessary ability to analyse, evaluate, select and choose in 
order to undertake an informed purchase. Often the issuing agent himself acts as an advisor. 
This leads to an inevitable conflict of interest that makes “unaware purchases” on behalf of 
the least informed agent all the more likely. With time innovation has led to increasingly 
complex products which in turn make it more and more difficult for agents to evaluate 
correctly, especially in terms of risks. This makes mistakes all the more likely, which in 
turn lead to social costs. 
Empirical  analyses
3  prove  that  innovation  goes  hand-in-hand  with  a  strong  fall  in  the 
interest rates on mortgages. Other studies show the positive effects of financial innovation: 
for instance the prices of the Single name credit default swaps (CDS) can convey important 
information, inasmuch as they anticipate rating’s changes (Hull, Predescu and White, 2004, 
and Houweling and Vorst, 2005). In theory, this could lower banks’ costs in selecting and 
monitoring enterprises issuing market traded CDS. Enterprises, in turn, could draw benefit 
by selling their bonds more easily. Therefore, thanks to these derivatives, they could even 
gain easier access to credit. CDSs are an extremely liquid contract. They are considered as a 
very simple way to exchange risk alternatively to bonds. 
Other economists instead are sceptical on the net positive effect of financial innovation on 
the economy. More in detail, many underline the costs it entails in terms of tax evasion or 
postponement, of the ensuing fall in fiscal revenue, in efficiency, equity and therefore in 
welfare. 
Moreover, it should be kept in mind that whenever banks take on uncovered risks, this 
damages society. How much this damage is relevant has become evident in the last years as 
sophisticated  securities  developed  thanks  to  financial  promoters  with  loose  ethical 
principles  and,  among  the  other  things,  thanks  also  to  the  diffusion  of  a  speculative 
mentality among families. Therefore it has been relatively easy to find a growing number of 
clients claiming returns above market ones and often scarcely aware of the risks entailed. 
While to-day, after the 2008 financial crisis, most commentators appear to be sceptical 
about  the  positive  effects  of  innovation,  during  the  last  ten  years  optimism  prevailed. 
Actually,  even  in  the  past  some  scholars  did  underline  the  dangers  of  an  excessive 
development of the market for derivatives, expressing fears that at the moment appeared to 
be  exaggerated.  Thus  in  1995  T.P.  Pare
4  claimed  that  if  financial  innovation  is  to  be 
considered a present, the donor is Alfred Hitchcock. In 2000 Huang
5 maintained that from 
the legal point of view derivatives should be considered as the inhabitants of a sort of 
Jurassic Park, as financial engineers create products that can destroy our civilisation. 
The Hedge Funds’ market does not obey ordinary law (Capriglione, 2004). For these funds, 
even more than for other cases in the world of finance, reaching adequate ethical standards 
depends crucially on prudential management and on intermediaries’ self-limitation. 
                                                
3 See for instance C. F. Sirmans and J. D. Benjamin (1990) and Jameson, Dewan and Sirmans (1992). 
4 Pare (1995) p. 197. 
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During  the  ‘Nineties  the  diffusion  of  complex  financial  instruments  such  as  reverse 
convertible ones
6 granted buyers interest rates equal the double those prevailing on markets, 
notwithstanding the period of low rates. However, when shares fall, investors lose (given 
that banks have an interest in using the put option). The complexity of the operations, on 
one hand, and the prevailing market conditions leading to forecasted growth in share prices 
on the other contributed to conceal to investors the actual risks of these funds and for many 
years allowed intermediaries to underline the perspective positive results to the detriment of 
the speculative aspects of the operations. Precisely the lack of knowledge concerning the 
implications of a possible change in the trend on the stock exchange pushed many agents to 
move their savings away from non-risky securities, such as Treasury bonds, to the new 
ones. 
Another instance of asymmetric information concerns the owners of index linked insurance 
policies, especially Vita index linked. Usually these contracts guarantee both a possible 
revaluation of the capital in case a certain index or pool of securities should grow, and the 
full  refund  of the  sums  that  have  been paid in due time. However,  many buyers  were 
unaware of the fact that the repayment of the capital is not guaranteed by the company that 
sells the insurance policy, but by the issuing agent at the basis of the contract. 
Lehman Brothers, that until the Stock Exchange crash was considered to be one of the five 
best  banks  in  the  world, was the  counterpart  of  many insurance  derivatives. Its  failure 
determined  heavy  losses  for  some  seventy  index  linked  securities  sold  by  Italian 
companies.  Other  insurance  policies  were  guaranteed  by  Icelandic  banks.  Actually  the 
Italian Commission for the control of the stock exchange had advised some companies 
selling such index securities  to publish a warning  on their internet site announcing the 
deterioration of the financial situation of the banks underlying the contracts. Apparently in 
Italy the exposure to “toxic” securities, such as those by Lehman Brothers, or to other 
financial  products  affected  by  the  Wall  Street  crash  is  rather  limited.  In  this  context 
surveillance is crucial. 
 
3. A perspective on how to overcome the financial crisis 
Financial innovation has positive goals, but it has caused relevant negative effects to the 
financial  system  in  the  course  of  time.  More  in  detail,  it  contributed  to  change 
intermediaries, allowing them to modify the degree of risk associated with their activity and 
their solvency without changing their external structure. Banks have become an access to 
capital markets and they have transferred their assets outside, to other specialised operators 
who in turn issue liabilities that are purchased by institutional investors who then transform 
and sell them to the final buyers. The transfer of risk to other agents weakens the bank’s 
incentive  to  rigorously  select  and  monitor  its  clients.  This  is  an  important  negative 
externality stemming from financial innovation. 
On the basis of all the considerations outlined above it is evident that financial innovation is 
a complex phenomenon that should have been carefully monitored by economic authorities 
both national and international. The development of financial innovation certainly is the 
main cause of financial crises. The latter are becoming more and more alarming. To avoid 
                                                
6 For instance “a bank purchases from a client (at a premium) European-type “put” options linked to 
the market value of a reference basket of shares and it sells to the same client Treasury bonds, that 
remain locked up to guarantee the bank’s option”. See (Antonucci, 2004, p. 204). Economic Interferences  ￿￿ 
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these crises, or at least to limit their impact, it is necessary to remove their causes and 
tightly regulate financial markets. 
The actions undertaken by the European Central Bank and by the Federal Reserve, i.e. 
greatly raising the system’s liquidity (in doing so the European Central Bank betrayed its 
main philosophy), may stabilize financial markets in the short run but do not solve the 
problem. Moreover, the expansion of liquidity may lead to inflation and the latter, added to 
uncertainty and to the current recession, could lead to stagflation.  
Even  nationalizations,  that  have  been  carried  out  in  a  country  like  the  United  States 
notwithstanding its philosophy in favour of privatizations that in Europe dates back to the 
‘Nineties, cannot go beyond a given limit. On the other hand regulation of financial markets 
appears far more urgent. It is necessary that Governments, especially the one of the United 
States, have the strength to impose their views on financial multinationals and on finance in 
general. 
Reducing the amount of short term capital implies reducing the foreign deficit of the United 
States which is the main source of disequilibria in the world economy. However, this is a 
very difficult problem to solve.  In fact it would be unlikely for dollar depreciation, even a 
very strong one, to improve the American current account balance. In the United States 
manufacturing is almost non-existent. The country exports weapons, technology linked to 
the military sector and finance. Balancing the current account is extremely difficult due to 
the structure of the American economy that does not produce any longer most of the goods 
currently used, but rather imports them from abroad. 
Instead, regulating financial  markets and  managing risk  is both  possible and extremely 
urgent. Let’s take the case of sub-prime mortgages. Banks systematically over-estimated 
clients’ creditworthiness. Previously the agent issuing a loan (the bank) was the same one 
that would have it repaid; therefore it would evaluate the client’s creditworthiness carefully. 
Nowadays  the  securitization  of  credits  allows  the  agent  issuing  the  loan  to  re-sell  it 
immediately on financial markets; it thus has very little interest in evaluating a client’s 
creditworthiness. 
Moreover banks, as mentioned, have created out-of-budget instruments to finance these 
operations, the so-called “structured investment vehicles” (SIV), which allow them to avoid 
surveillance and prudential rules. 
Financial sector surveillance has the difficult task of planning and enforcing rules of the 
game  that  maximise  the  incentives  for  virtuous  behaviour,  discourage  free  riding  and 
protect agents for whom innovation stands to determine information disadvantages. 
It  is  necessary  to  regulate  financial  markets  and  to  limit  banks’  and  other  operators’ 
possibilities to take on excessive risk. Surveillance and prudential rules must be upgraded; 
they cannot be sacrificed in the name of free market and competition. 
Concerning the huge increase in money supply on behalf of the Federal Reserve and the 
European Central Bank, one commentator (X.Vives, Bagehot ha ancora ragione, -Bagehot 
is  still  right-  in  Lavoce.info  of  03.04.2008)  recalled  the  Bagehot  doctrine  of  1873, 
according to which in a crisis the central bank, as a lender of last resort, should lend money 
(at a penalty rate) to banks that are illiquid but solvent and provide adequate guarantees. 
The difficulty of putting this doctrine into practice is that central banks are not always able 
to distinguish between insolvent banks and others that are only illiquid, just as not always ￿￿  Some Thoughts on Financial Innovation  and Financial Crises 
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can  they  evaluate  the  guarantees  correctly.  For  instance,  good  quality  guarantees  are 
Treasury Bonds or other minimum risk bonds. 
In this respect in the first place it is worth noting that surveillance should remain firmly in 
the hands of central banks, contrary to recent tendencies going in the opposite direction. A 
further problem is represented by the fact that central banks issue loans also to agencies 
such  as  Bear  Sterns,  over  which  they  do  not  exert  surveillance  and  concerning  whose 
solvency they thus have limited information. According to some opinions, banks should be 
able to detect and to manage their own risks by themselves. 
In the United States part of the responsibility of surveillance is assigned to the single States, 
i.e.  to  fifty  different  authorities.  In  Europe  there  is  a  European  Committee  for  bank 
surveillance, a counselling organism of fifty-one members. Co-operation among the central 
banks  is  regulated  by  more  than  eighty  bilateral  and  multilateral  memoranda.  In  this 
situation there evidently is a crisis of surveillance models, which allowed excessive risk-
taking in the context of financial innovation. Innovation ultimately created the instruments, 
such as securitization, to by-pass surveillance and its rules. 
Some scholars underline that even when structured investment vehicles did not yet exist 
nevertheless strong financial crises did occur. An instance are the crises of American banks 
in the ‘Eighties and that of Japanese ones during the ‘Nineties in the last century. The 
problem  therefore  does  not  lie  in  the  instruments  of  financial  innovation  but  rather  in 
regulation and surveillance. 
The Financial Stability Forum and the Governor of the Bank of Italy Draghi maintain that 
the  financial  system  will  have  to  have  less  debt  and  more  capital.  The  report  of  the 
Financial Stability Forum considers the rapid adoption of the new prudential criteria of 
Basle  II  and  an  increase  in  capital  requirements,  especially  for  structured  products,  an 
essential step. The Report suggests the instruments to improve the management of liquidity 
and  risk,  raise  the  accounting  transparency  of  financial  institutions,  operate  on  rating 
mechanism and guide interventions in a crisis. It obtained the approval of the Group of 
Seven. 
As noted by the Governor of the Bank of Italy in his Final Considerations on May 31 2008 
the guidelines contained in the Report generally do not need new legislation, but can be 
adopted directly by the authorities in charge of surveillance. However it is preferable that 
also  appropriate  laws  are  adopted  in  order  to  avoid  recurrent  financial  crisis  with 
devastating effects. 
When a financial crisis of the dimension of the present one occurs it has heavy real effects. 
Under  a  more  general  point  of  view  the  present  functioning  of  financial  markets,  and 
especially the possibility of assuming risk without adequate mechanisms of regulation and 
control, distort the real economy. If the macro effects of massive money creation on behalf 
of central banks amount to inflation and possibly stagflation, the micro ones are equally 
negative inasmuch as they distort credit and financial flows. These effects are not limited to 
the  short  run  but  have  long  run  consequences  on  the  structure  of  the  real  economy. 
Financial policies have distortive effects that may destroy healthy enterprises. 
However, it would be important to understand and to analyse why a country like the United 
States in which finance prevails over the real economy has a constant and incurable current 
account deficit, while a country like Germany, with a public banking sector and a strong Economic Interferences  ￿￿ 
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public  participation  in  production,  a  manufacturing  sector  still  strongly  rooted  in  its 
territory, a very strong presence of trade unions, is the first world exporter (in terms of the 
absolute volume of exports) and has a continuous surplus in its trade and current account 
balance. 
This casts doubts on the general views often expressed in a simplistic and mechanical way 
concerning the “American model of a free market economy”. It is often forgotten that the 
considerable growth capacity displayed by the American economy especially during the 
‘Nineties  in  last  century  is  intimately  linked  to  the  absence  of  an  external  constraint. 
Moreover, the idea that the American trade deficit is a natural consequence of high growth 
rates in China and India, that benefit from low labour costs, is hard to share, given that the 
first  exporter  in  the  world  is  Germany  and  other  countries,  such  as  Japan  and  some 
European countries like the Netherlands, notwithstanding their labour costs and the cost of 
the welfare state are higher than those of the United States, follow closely. 
To restore a healthy balance between economic and financial activity is therefore urgent 
even if it is not an easy task, given a framework in which international liquidity is huge and 
largely out of control of Governments and central banks. 
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